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In order to satisfy the safety-critical requirements, the train control system (TCS) often employs a layered safety communica-
tion protocol to provide reliable services. However, both description and verification of the safety protocols may be formidable 
due to the system complexity. In this paper, interface autómata (IA) are used to describe the safety service interface behaviors 
of safety communication protocol. A formal verification method is proposed to describe the safety communication protocols 
using IA and transíate IA model into PROMELA model so that the protocols can be verified by the model checker SPIN. A 
case study of using this method to describe and verify a safety communication protocol is included. The verification results il-
lustrate that the proposed method is effective to describe the safety protocols and verify deadlocks, hvelocks and several 
mandatory consistency properties. A prototype of safety protocols is also developed based on the presented formally verifying 
method. 
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1 Introduction 
Train control system (TCS) supporting safety-critical appli-
cations [1-4] often employs a layered protocol to provide 
various safety services [5-7]. A safety layer is required to 
be inserted between a transport layer and an application 
layer. The service interface between the application layer 
and the safety layer gives the data flows to/from the safety 
layer, which provides safety services. Since such a stack of 
the safety protocols may form the basis for numerous criti-
cal applications [8], their verification for safety concerns 
warrants strong guarantees of correctness and rigorous for-
mal verification methods [9]. 
In the past decades, a number of efforts have been made 
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in describing and verifying the protocols using formal 
method. Lee et al. [10-12] described a TCS protocol using 
label transition system (LTS) and verified it by model 
checking. Katsaros [13] used colored petri nets (CPN) and 
the CPN Tools environment to edit an electronic payment 
protocol model and verified the CPN model by computation 
tree logic (CTL) based model checking. Sinha et al. [8,14, 15] 
showed how a complex protocol could be easily formalized 
by the reuse of the formal specification and verification of 
individual functional primitives of the chosen protocol. 
However, our observation is that these methods cannot de-
scribe the interface behaviors between adjacent layers ex-
plicitly, which makes them not very suitable for modeling 
and verifying the safety service interface behaviors of the 
safety protocols. 
Ouzzif [16] presented a formal description of a floor 
control protocol using finite state machine (FSM) and 
checked it by the SPIN verification tool. He depicted the 
message sequence chart (MSC) as a script of interactions 
among the components. Schafer et al. [17] and Inverardi et 
al. [18] described the component behaviors characteristics 
using unified modeling language (UML) state diagram and 
translated them into some PROMELA models. Meanwhile, 
the models of the UML interactive and sequential diagrams 
are used to describe the dynamic interactive relationships 
between the components. Finally, they were described by 
some linear temporal logic (LTL) formulas and verified by 
SPIN. But a main safety property of safety protocols in TCS 
is the absence of deadlocks. These methods did not mention 
how to analyze the deadlocks in the system specification 
using the counterexample given by SPIN. Moreover, UML 
state diagram is a semi-formal means of description without 
a mathematical basis, which might result in ambiguity and 
unsafety [8]. 
In order to satisfy the specific requirements of the safety 
communication protocols, interface autómata (IA) are 
chosen precisely because of their characteristics. IA are 
good choices to describe the layered safety protocols due 
to the following features. (1) They are good at describing 
the safety service interface behaviors of the layered pro-
tocols. (2) IA are formal description methods with a 
mathematical basis. (3) They allow the existence of the 
blocking states, which can be used to detect and analyze 
the deadlocks. As a modeling language of SPIN, 
PROMELA can describe all the elements of IA. The 
translation rules from the IA model to the PROMELA 
model can also be defined to guarantee the consistent per-
formance. The developed method relies on the applications 
of IA and SPIN for (1) abstracting and describing the lay-
ered safety protocols with a layer-based formal method, (2) 
detecting deadlocks and livelocks in the safety protocol 
behavior specifications, and (3) verifying consistency 
properties of the safety protocols by the LTL based model 
checking. The advantage of this method is that it can de-
scribe the safety service interface behaviors explicitly. It is 
also very expert at analyzing the causes of the deadlocks in 
the specification of the safety protocols in TCS. To ¿Ilús-
trate the presented method, a TCS safety protocol is cho-
sen as a case study. This protocol highlights the layer 
characteristics of safety protocols that typically provide 
the reliable safety services. In addition, an implementation 
of the safety communication protocol is described. 
2 Interface autómata 
IA were proposed by Alfaro [19]. They are formal tools for 
modeling and analyzing the high level of specifications 
[20-24]. Unlike input/output (I/O) autómata [25], IA have 
assumption environment. IA do not require any input-
enabling, and allow the existence of blocking states, 
which are suitable for modeling the terminating processes 
and checking whether the assumption environment is right 
[19]. Chakrabarti et al. [22, 23] used extended IA to de-
scribe the more complicated interface behaviors. Edward 
[24] proposed some extensions to the theory of IA to de-
fine the interaction types and the dynamic behaviors of 
the components. An interface automaton P is defined as 
follows: 
Definition 1. An interface automaton P=(VP, vfil, 
A[p, A°, Ap , rP) consists of the following elements: 
• VP is a set of states; each state is symbolized as 
v,.(0</<|FP |). 
• VPlmt cK p is a set of initial states; one vfil contains 
at most one state; if v/"" = //>, then P is called empty. 
9 A'p, A°, AHP are mutually disjoint sets of input, 
output and internal actions; Ap = Ap'[] Ap° [] APH is the 
set of all actions; if aeApr (resp. aeAp°, aeApH), 
then (v,a,v') is called an input (resp. output, internal) 
step. 
• rp cVpxApxVp is a set of steps. 
The interface automation P is closed if it has only inter-
nal actions, otherwise P is open. An action aeAp is en-
abled at the state veVp, if there is a step (v,a,v')erp 
for some v' eVp. It is indicated that the subsets of input, 
output, and internal actions are enabled at the state v 
with Ap (v), A° (v), Ap (v) respectively, and Ap (v) = A'p (v) 
UAp(v)[jAf(v). Unlike the I/O autómata, an interface 
automaton is not required to be input enabled (it is not re-
quired that Ap (v) = Ap for all states of v). The set Ap (v) 
of the enabled input actions appoints which inputs are ac-
cepted at the state v. The inputs in Ap\Ap(v) are called the 
illegal inputs at the state v. 
Definition 2. Two interface autómata P and Q are com-
posable if 
A'PV[AL=<I>, AHP[\AQ=^, 
(1) 
A%C\Ap=t, A°p[\A°Q=(l>. 
It makes 
s\mQá(P,Q) = Ap(\AQ. (2) 
Note that if two interface autómata P and Q are composable, 
s\med(P,Q) = (Apf}A%)\J(Ap []A'Q) and their product 
P®Q as defined by Alfaro et al. [19] is also an interface 
automaton. 
Definition 3. Given two composable IA P and Q, the 
set Hlegal(P,Q)cVpxVe of the illegal states of P®Q 
is defined by 
Illegal (P,Q)-. 
System description 
(y,u) eVpxV \3ae shared(P,g) 
\A°Av)f\a^AI0{u) 
\ A°{u) f\a <£ A'{y) 
(3 ) 
Since IA are not necessarily input-enabled, in the product 
of two IA P and Q(P®Q), one of the autómata may 
produce an output action that is the input action of the other 
automaton, but it is not accepted. The set Illegal(f, Q) of 
the states of P ® Q is called the illegal states of the prod-
uct. Alfaro et al. [19] proved that some illegal states could 
be reachable in some certain environment. If there is no are 
from the reachable illegal state to other states, the system is 
caused to terminate. IA have the illegal state and allow the 
environment assumption, which can be used to describe and 
analyze the implicit deadlocks in the specification of the 
safety protocols. 
3 A method to verify the safety protocols 
3.1 Method workflow 
The workflow, a common waterfall model to verify the 
safety protocols, is shown in Figure 1. IA, UML sequence 
diagram and SPIN are combined and applied to do most of 
the work. In the first step, some critical scenario-based 
safety service interactions of the safety protocols are de-
scribed by UML sequence diagram. Then some consisteney 
verifying problems can be chosen from these UML se-
quence diagram models. IA are restricted and used to de-
scribe safety service interface behaviors of the components 
by abstracting away the details of computation referring to 
the chosen consisteney verifying problems. Model Transla-
tion involves the translation from IA model to PROMELA 
model and the description of the consisteney verifying 
problems using LTL. The description of the verifying prob-
lems must refer to the PROMELA model. Deadlocks and 
livelocks are the properties in a system, which cannot be 
described and checked using LTL. In addition, the checking 
of them is crucial for correctly expressing the LTL-based 
formulae, which is used to verify the protocol properties. 
Therefore the deadlocks and livelocks checking should be 
performed before the LTL properties verification. Based on 
the deadlocks and livelocks analysis, the LTL properties are 
able to be verified using SPIN. There are three possible 
verifying results for one property, which include: satisfac-
tion, violation and out of memory. 
3.2 System description 
3.2.1 Getting the consisteney verifying problems 
The UML sequence diagrams have gained wide acceptance 
IA models J Q~ Translation rules J) 
i: 
Properties verification 
|Correct 
Figure 1 Waterfall model of safety protocols verification. 
for scenario-based specifications of the component interac-
tions [26]. They are used to show how entities interact in a 
system [27]. The entities can be, for example, subsystems, 
components, pieces of software, or users. In this study, the 
UML sequence diagrams are used to obtain the description 
of the scenario-based safety service interactions. 
The problem of verifying the safety protocol specifica-
tions for the scenario-based safety service requirements is 
considered. Some consistency verifying problems can be 
selected from the UML sequence diagram models. Li et al. 
[28] developed the method to solve the following two veri-
fying problems. 
Existential consistency verifying problem, which means 
that a scenario described by a given UML sequence diagram 
must happen during a system run, or any forbidden scenario 
described by a given UML sequence diagram should never 
happen during a system run. 
Forward mandatory consistency verifying problem, 
which means that if a reference scenario described by one 
given UML sequence diagram occurs during a system run, it 
must conform to a scenario described by the other given 
UML sequence diagram. 
3.2.2 Modeling the safety protocols using IA 
Model checking has to solve the problem of the explosión 
of the state space inevitably. The method proposed by 
Holzmann to solve this problem is to use design abstraction 
[29, 30], which is to assist the designer in the analysis of 
high-level abstractions without requiring the resolution of 
implementation-level detail. In our modeling method, the 
abstraction should be detailed enough to capture the essence 
of the specification and the IA model should be the smallest 
but sufficient model that allows designer to perform a veri-
fication of the interested properties. 
In order to implement the modeling method, an 
H = \l\, P2, P3, P4, P5} is defined as a set of composable IA, 
which is used to describe the control-oriented abstraction 
[29] model of the safety protocols. Pu P5 are used to de-
scribe the safety service users of the two sides of communi-
cation respectively. They are upper layers of the safety layer. 
P3 is used to model the transport layer below the safety 
layer, which is used to provide the transport services. P2 and 
PA are defined as the two sides of the safety layers. 
S = \s\mQá(P¡,Pj)\\<i,j<5,i*j} is a set of all the 
shared actions in H . Two restrictions for H are defined as 
Restriction 1. 
shared(^,P,) = ^ ( | / - y | > l ) . (4) 
Restriction 2. 
shared(P,,PM)C\shared(^+1 ,Pl+2) = 0,(1< / < 3). (5) 
Restriction 1 provides that there are no shared actions 
between two nonadjacent IA in H. Based on Restriction 1, 
Restriction 2 provides that every shared action in H must be 
shared only between two interface autómata. It is not al-
lowed for three or more interface autómata to share the 
same actions. 
As defined by Hu [31], a two-tuple N=(H, S) which has 
been mentioned above is an IA network (IAN). Its illegal 
states set is defined as 
Illegal(A0 = {(Vl>v2,...,v5) e N | 3(v,.,v.)(/ * j ; \ < i,j < 5), 
3a e shared(^,Pj), (a e A° (v,.)/\a<tAIp (v,) 
v a e ^ ( v . ) A f l í 4 ( v , . ) ) } . (6) 
Since IA are not necessarily input-enabled, one of the 
autómata may produce an output action that is not accepted 
by any other autómata. Illegal(AO indicates the illegal 
states of N when this situation happens. In the real proto-
cols, an illegal state can be reached and a deadlock may 
occur because of design defects in specifications. SPIN 
can be used to find these deadlocks by translating the IA 
model into the PROMELA model with the translation rules 
described below. 
3.3 Model translation 
3.3.1 Translation rules from IA to the PROMELA model 
PROMELA allows for the dynamic creation of concurrent 
processes [32]. Communication via message channels can 
be defined to be synchronous (i.e., rendezvous), or asyn-
chronous (i.e., buffered). The behavior of a process is de-
fined by a proctype declaration. Each PROMELA model of 
a process can be described as a finite state automaton [29]. 
Mikk et al. [33] translated the UML statecharts into the 
PROMELA models and then realized the verification. But 
the translator did not support the full sublanguage of state-
charts. Our translation rules support all the definitions of the 
elements of IA. Lilius et al. [34] proposed a method for 
translating the UML model into the PROMELA model, 
where each UML class was mapped to a PROMELA proc-
ess. We map each interface automaton into a PROMELA 
process, and the translation rules are as follows: 
Interface automaton P¡: Each interface automaton P¡ 
should be mapped to a declaration of process, for example, 
proctype P_i (chati rcv). 
The receiving channel of P¡: Each process should define 
a message channel CHchannelName, for example, chati 
CHchannelName=[0] of {mtype, . . . } . Particularly, the 
channels of an intermedíate safety layer (P2 and P4) should 
be defined as an array. Array elements 0 and 1 are the 
channels for the SFM of the sponsor and the follower re-
spectively. 
State v;.(0 < /' < \VP\): Each state of an automaton should 
be mapped to a progress-state label, and the initial state la-
bels should be put in the entry point of each process struc-
ture of proctype. 
Input action aeAp: Each input action in an automaton 
should be mapped to a receiving statement, for example, 
rcv?variablel (variable2, ...). 
Output action aeA°: Each output action in an automa-
ton should be mapped to a sending statement, for example, 
channel ñame ! variablel (variable2, ...). 
Internal action aeAp: Each intemal action in an 
automaton should be mapped to a PROMELA statement 
except for the sending and receiving statements. 
Step (v, a, v'): After an action v is executed, the state is 
transferred into v' by executing the statement "goto label -
Name", where labelName represents the progress-state label 
ofv'. 
In order to check the deadlocks caused by the reachable 
illegal states, the channel should be defined as a rendezvous 
port whose capacity is zero. A rendezvous port can only 
pass, but not store messages. Message interactions via such 
rendezvous ports are defined to be synchronous. If there is 
no matching receiving operation for it in other processes, 
the message sending statement in a process will be blocked. 
Meanwhile, the reachable illegal state which may lead to 
deadlocks could be found out by model checker SPIN via 
checking the invalid end-state as well. 
3.3.2 Description of consistency verifying problems 
Holzmann [29] promoted the frequently used LTL formulae 
to express the correctness properties. For example, [] p 
stand for that p is invariantly true. In this study, the method 
for describing the protocol specifications consistency veri-
fying problems is as follows: 
Existential consistency verifying problem. QD is used 
to describe that scenario D is guaranteed to eventually hap-
pen at least once in a run; [] \D is used to describe that sce-
nario D never happens during a run. 
Forward mandatory consistency verifying problem. 
[](Dl —>{)D2) is used to describe that if scenario Di hap-
pens, D2 is guaranteed to eventually happen at least once in 
a run. 
3.4 Properties verification 
Two important model correctness criterions are the absence 
of deadlocks and livelocks. They should be checked before 
verifying the LTL described properties. Some IA may very 
well linger in a known waiting state, or they may sit pa-
tiently in a loop ready to spring back to action when new 
input arrives. To make it clear to the verifier that these al-
térnate end states are also valid, some special labels can be 
defined which are called end-state labels. The end-state la-
bel defines that it is not an error, if the process waits at the 
label [29] in the end of an execution sequence. If the trans-
lation rules defined above are used, the reachable illegal 
states in IA model which may lead to deadlocks will be 
found by SPIN via checking the invalid end-state of the 
model. The livelocks in PROMELA can be detected using 
non-progress loops [29]. A livelock is detected, when the 
state space contains a cycle that leads to no way outside the 
cycle. SPIN can verify that every permitted infinite execu-
tion cycle that passes through at least one of the progress 
labels in that model. If cycles can be found not to have this 
property, the verifier can declare the existence of a non-
progress loop, corresponding to possible starvation. 
4 Case study: verification of a safety protocol 
4.1 A safety commu nication protocol in TCS 
The ERTMS consortium has defined a set of specifications 
for the European high-speed railways in which traditional 
signaling has been replaced by radio signaling via global 
system mobile-railway (GSM-R). In the ERTMS level 2 
radio communication system, an on-board system transmits 
the train position report to a radio block center (RBC). Train 
separation is managed by RBC that transmits the movement 
authority (MA) with static speed profile (SSP) to the trains 
via radio regarding the position, conditions of railway line, 
etc. The safety of passengers depends on the reliability of 
the communication system. The safety protocol thus plays a 
major role in the implementation of the TCS. Since GSM-R 
is not able to guarantee an acceptable safety level for the 
critical data transmission, it is necessary to add safety-
related transmission functions upon the non-trusted channel 
according to IEC 62280-2 [35] and the safety protocol of 
EURORADIO [36] . 
The EURORADIO safety protocol is a layered protocol 
[2] using service primitives to interact between different 
layers. The safety service structure is shown in Figure 2. 
The service interface between the safety functional module 
(SFM) and the safety service (SaS) user gives the data flows 
to/from the SFM, which provides safety services. The SaS 
user exchanges data with the SaS provider to get the safety 
services which provide safety connection set-up, and safety 
data transfer during the connection lifetime. The SFM re-
ports the errors that occur in the safety layer and transfers 
the error indications from the lower layers. A safety entity 
of the SFM communicates with its users through one or 
more safety service access points (SaSAP) using the safety 
service primitives. For example, the safety service primitive 
Sa-CONN.req represents a safety connection set-up request, 
where the symbol "Sa" represents safety and the symbol 
"CONN.req" represents connection request. The peer safety 
entities of the SFM support the safety connection exchanges 
by means of safety protocol data units (SaPDU), using the 
services of the transport layer via one transport connection 
(TC) through one transport service access point (TSAP). 
For example, AUl, AU2 and AR represent the SaPDUs of 
first authentication message, second authentication message 
and authentication response respectively. Communication 
functional module (CFM) is used to provide transport ser-
vice (TS) using transport service primitive, and the safety 
entity plays the role of a TS user. For example, the transport 
service primitive T-CONN.req means a transport connec-
tion request to CFM, where the symbol "T" represents 
transport and "CONN.req" represents a TC request. The 
symbols "DISC", "CONN", "DATA" and "HP-DATA" 
User 
layer 
Safety functional module 
SaS provider entity 
Safety layer entity 
TS user entity 
TSAP 
Transport 
layer t 1 
Communication functional 
module 
• • • 
1 
1 
> 
Normal priority data 
High priority data 
t 
Communication functional 
module 
• i • 
t t 
Figure 2 Safety service structure of ETCS communication protocol. 
represent connection disconnect, connect set-up, data transfer 
and high priority (HP) data transfer respectively, while the 
symbols "req", "ind", "resp" and "conf' represent request, 
indication, response and confírmation respectively. These 
symbols are used to make up all the primitives, which are 
consistent with the acronyms and abbreviations described in 
the EURORADIO functional interface specifícation [36]. 
4.2 A UML sequence diagram model of the safety pro-
tocol in TCS 
Figure 3 shows a UML sequence diagram representing the 
simple interactions between six entities of two communica-
tion parties. This sequence diagram shows a scenario where 
one communication side establishes a safety connection 
with another side. The process of establishing a safety con-
nection is initiated when the SaS user requests a connection 
to the SFM using the service primitive Sa-CONN.req. Then 
the safety layer requests transport connection establishment 
using the service primitive T-CONN.req. This service 
primitive includes the first message of the peer entity au-
thentication procedure (AU1 SaPDU) as user-data. The 
SFM will send the AU1 SaPDU to the SFM of the other 
side using the transport connection request service primitive 
Safety service user 
Safe functional module 
Sa-CONN.req 
Sa-CONN.conf 
Safe functional module 
Communication functional 
module 
Communication functional 
module 
T-CONN.req(AU1 SaPDU) 
T-CONN.conf(AU2 SaPDU) 
T-DATA.req(AU3 SaPDU) 
T-DATA.ind(AR SaPDU) 
' T-CONN.ind (AU1 SaPDU) 
iT-CONN.resp (AU2 SaPDU) 
JT-CONN.ind (AU3 SaPDU) 
¡ T-DATA.req (AR SaPDU) 
Safety service user 
Sa-CONN.ind 
Sa-CONN.resp 
Figure 3 UML sequence diagram for safe connection set-up of normal execution. 
through the CFMs. If it is accepted, the safety entity re-
sponds to the TC establishment request using the service 
primitive T-CONN.resp. It includes the second message of 
the peer entity authentication protocol (AU2 SaPDU). Once 
the messages are received, the calling CFM informs the 
safety layer of the successful establishment of the transport 
connection using the service primitive T-CONN.conf. The 
AU2 SaPDU is forwarded to the safety layer as user-data 
within this service primitive. SFM then generates the AU3 
SaPDU that contains the third message of the authentication 
protocol. It uses the T-DATA.req service primitive to for-
ward this message to the transport layer. Once the messages 
are received, CFM uses the service primitive T-DATA.ind 
to forward the AU3 SaPDU to the safety layer. In the case 
of a successful AU3 SaPDU evaluation, the safety entity 
forwards the service primitive Sa-CONN.ind to the safety 
user. If the safety user accepts the safety connection estab-
lishment request, it responds with the primitive Sa-
CONN.resp. The safety entity on the called side sends the 
authentication response message including the authentica-
tion data (AR SaPDU) to its peer safety entity. 
After a successful evaluation of this SaPDU, the safety 
entity informs the SaS user that a safety connection is now 
successfully established, using the service primitive 
Sa-CONN.conf. A máximum connection establishment de-
lay timer restab is used by the SFM of the calling side for 
detecting unacceptable delay during the connection estab-
lishment. The timer restab is started after the receipt of the 
Sa-CONN.req and is stopped before the generation of the 
Sa-CONN.conf. In the case of timeout, a Sa-DISC.ind is 
generated including a proper reason. 
4.3 An IA model of the EURORADIO safety protocol 
Foliowing the method presented above, H={Pi, P2, P3, P4, 
P5} is used to describe the abstracted model of the safety 
protocol. P1? P2? P^ P^ P5 represent the SaS user of the 
connection sponsor, the SFM of the connection sponsor, the 
transport layer, the SFM of the connection follower and the 
SaS user of the connection sponsor respectively. P\ and P5 
are illustrated in Figure 4. The inner structures of P2 and P4 
are shown in Figure 5. P3 is shown in Figure 6. 
The descriptions of Pu P5, P2? PA and P3, are shown as 
follows: 
SaS user of the sponsor Px: Px sends the safety connec-
tion set-up request to P2 using the safety service primitive 
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Figure 4 Interface automaton models of P\ and P5. 
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(a) The inside structure of the interface automaton for the SFM of the connection sponsor P2 
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Figure 5 IA models of P2 and P4. 
Sa-CONN.req. After Px receives the safety connection 
set-up confirmation primitive Sa-CONN.conf, it can trans-
mit either normal data or HP data depending on the type of 
service primitives. Sa-DATA.req_S! || Sa-HP-DATA.req_S! 
means a safety connection sponsor sends a Sa-DATA.req or 
Sa-HP-DATA.req to P2. 
SaS user of the follower P5: After P5 receives the safety 
connection set-up indication primitive Sa-CONN.ind, it 
sends the safety connection response primitive to P4 and 
then P5 reaches the data transmitting state. In this state, ei-
ther normal data or HP data can be transmitted by P5. 
SFM of the connection sponsor P2: During the state 
IDLE_S, P2 waits for the safety connection set-up request 
primitive. The process of establishing a safety connection is 
initiated when P2 receives a safety connection set-up request 
from Pi via the primitive Sa-CONN.req. If the Sa- CONN.req 
T-C0NN.req_S(t7) 
T-CONN.resp_F(ty) 
T-HP-DATA.req_F(¿y) 
T-HP-DATA.req_S(¿y) 
T-DATA.req_S(¿y) 
T-DISC.req_S(ty) 
T-DATA.req_F(¿y) 
T-DISC.req_F(¿y) 
j f^ \HP_F_T 
/ T-HP-DATA.ind_S(t7)! CONRS_F_T 
T-HP-DATA.req_F(¿y)? 
T-CONN.resp_F(¿y)? 
DA F T 
T-DATA.req_F(ty)? ^ ^ 
T-DATA.ind_S(¿y)! ^ > ^ 
DISC F T 
HP S T 
Figure 6 IA model of TS layer P3. 
T-CONN.ind_F(t7) 
T-CONN.conf_S(ty) 
T-HP-DATA.ind_S(¿y) 
T-HP-DATA.ind_F(¿y) 
T-DATA.ind_F(t7) 
T-DISC.ind_F(¿y) 
T-DATA.ind_S(¿y) 
T-DISC.ind_S(í7) 
is not reachable, P2 shall send the safety connection dis-
connection primitive Sa-DISC.ind to Px and return to the 
state IDLE_S, otherwise P2 can send the AU1 SaPDU to P4 
via the transport connection request primitive T-CONN.req. 
If P2 receives the right AU2 SaPDU from P4, it will send the 
third authentication AU3 SaPDU to P4, and then P2 starts to 
wait for the authentication response (AR SaPDU) in the 
state WFAR_S. In the states WFTC_S and WFAR_S, if the 
safety connection establishment time exceeds the upper 
bound, P2 needs to send the safety disconnection indication 
primitive Sa-DISC.ind to P\ and the transport disconnection 
request primitive T-DISC.req to P3, and then returns to the 
state IDLE_S. The two dashed ares in P2 are used to model 
the response events when restab is up. In the state WFAR_S, 
if P2 receives the right AR SaPDU, it will send the safety 
connection confirmation primitive Sa-CONN.conf and 
reach the state DATA_S, then the safety connection is es-
tablished successfully. In the state DATA_S, P2 can com-
municate with P4 using data SaPDU DT and high priority 
data SaPDU HP. If P2 receives the safety disconnection 
request primitive Sa-DISC.req from Pi or the transport dis-
connection indication primitive T-DISC.ind from P3, it will 
return to the state IDLE_S. 
SFM of the connection follower P4: At the very begin-
ning, P4 stays in the state IDLE_F, waiting for the transport 
connection indication primitive T-CONN.ind with AU1 
SaPDU. If P4 receives the unacceptable primitive T-
CONN.ind or SaPDU AU1, it will send the transport dis-
connection request primitive T-DISC.req with DI SaPDU to 
P3 and return to the state IDLE_F. If P4 receives the accept-
able primitive T-CONN.ind and SaPDU AU1, it will send the 
transport connection response primitive T-CONN.resp with 
AU2 SaPDU to P3 and reach the state WFAU3_F. After P4 
receives the acceptable transport data request primitive 
T-DATA.req with AU3 SaPDU and sends the safety con-
nection indication primitive Sa-CONN.ind to P5, it will 
reach the state WFRESP_F and wait for the safety connec-
tion response primitive Sa-CONN.resp. After P4 sends the 
AR SaPDU to P2 through P3, it will reach the state 
DATA_F. P4 can communicate with P2 using the DT 
SaPDU or the HP SaPDU depending on the data priority. 
TS Layer P3: P3 is used to receive transport service 
primitives from one side of the safety layer and sends the 
corresponding primitives to the other side. For example, 
after P3 receives the transport connection set-up request 
primitive T-CONN.req from P2, it sends the transport con-
nection set-up indication primitive to P4. There are two 
connections from the state DISC_S_T to the state IDLE_T, 
in which the one without any actions models the data lost in 
the TS layer. T-DISC.ind_F(w) represents the transport pri-
mitive T-DISC.ind_F which contains a SaPDU u. 
The purpose of the protocol verification is to find the 
design defeets and verify whether some properties are sat-
isfied. It is better to describe some abnormal situations in 
the interface automaton of the safety layer. For example, if 
a message error oceurs during transmission, a CRC error 
will be checked when the receiver gets the message. This 
kind of abnormal situation should be described in IA. The 
output action T-DISC.req_S transited from CONF_S to 
IDLE_S stands for the situation that an error oceurs in the 
message transmitting process. When the SFM of the con-
nection sponsor receives the unacceptable AU2 SaPDU, the 
SFM sends the disconnect requirement to the transport 
layer. 
4.4 Verification of the safety commu nication protocols 
One aim of verification is to verify if the protocol is pro-
vided with some properties, and gives the route of the 
counterexamples. In order to illustrate the effect of the pre-
sented method on verifying deadlocks, livelocks and several 
mandatory consistency properties, some properties are pre-
sented as an example. 
Property 1 (Deadlock). The deadlocks can be detected 
via checking the invalid end-states of the model. 
Property 2 (Livelocks). The livelocks can be detected 
using non-progress loops. 
Property 3 (Forward mandatory consistency). The 
SaS user of the sponsor will be able to receive the connec-
tion confirmation after it sends the safety connection re-
quest. 
LTL: 
[](SaUserS_SaConnReq —>• () SaUserS_SaConnConf) 
SaUserS_SaConnReq means that the SaS user of the 
sponsor is in the connection requesting sub-state; 
SaUserS_SaConnConf means that the SaS user of the 
sponsor is in the receiving connection confirmation 
sub-state. 
Property 4 (Existential consistency). The SaS user will 
never receive the disconnection indication from the under 
layer during a PROMELA run. 
LTL: []! (SaUserS_SaDistfnd) 
SaUserS_SaDiscInd means that the SaS user of the 
sponsor is in the receiving disconnection indication 
sub-state. 
Property 5 (Forward mandatory consistency). After 
the SaS user of the sponsor sends the service primitive 
SaHpDataReq, the SFM of the sponsor will be able to send 
the primitive THpDataReq. 
LTL: 
[](SaUserS_SaHpDataReq —>•() SaLA_THpDataReq) 
SaUserS_SaHpDataReq means that the SaS user of the 
sponsor is requested to send HP data; 
SaLAJTHpDataReq means that the SFM of the sponsor 
is requested to send HP data. 
Property 6. The SFM of the sponsor is always in the 
state IDLE_SS until it receives the service primitive Sa-
DiscReq; the SFM of the follower is always in the state 
IDLE_SF until it receives the service primitive TConnlnd. 
LTL: 
SaLA_IDLE[j SaLayA_SaConnReq 
SaLB_IDLE U SaLayB_TConnInd 
SaLA_IDLE means that the SFM of the sponsor is in the 
idle state; 
SaLayA_SaConnReq means that the SFM of the sponsor 
is in the connection requesting sub-state; 
SaLB_IDLE means that the SFM of the follower is in the 
idle state; 
SaLayBJTConnlnd means that the SaS user of the fol-
lower is in the receiving connection indication sub-state. 
SPIN's typical working mode is to start with the specifi-
cations of a high level model of a concurrent system, or 
distributed algorithm, typically using SPIN's graphical 
front-end XSPIN [29]. All the experiments are done on a 
2.4 GHz Pentium 4 processor, with 512 MB of main mem-
ory. At the very beginning, the IA model of H without 
modeling the timer of restab is verified. In this case, the two 
dashed ares in P2 do not exist. 
Using the XSPIN's model checking function, a deadlock 
is checked out. Even though end-state labels are added to 
the right end states, an invalid end state can be found. The 
trace of H, which leads to the deadlock, is analyzed and 
acquired using the SPIN's counterexample. As shown in 
Figure 7, the safety connection establishing process is 
started in the lst step. The abnormal situation starts in the 
6th step, where H={PU P2, P3, PA, PS} is in the state 
(WAIT_SS, CONF_F, IDLE_T, WFAU3_F, IDLE_SF). 
Because of the unacceptable T-CONN.ind or AU1 SaPDU, 
P2 sends the transport disconnection primitive of T-DISC.req 
to P3. After P3 receives the primitive, H reaches the state 
(WAIT_SS, DISC_1_S, DISC_S_T, WFAU3_F, IDLE_SF). 
When the data is lost in the TS layer, P3 will return to the 
state IDLE_T without sending the transport disconnection 
indication to PA, and H will reach the state (WAIT_SS, 
DISC_1_S, IDLE_T, WFAU3_F, IDLE_SF). After Px 
receives the safety disconnection indication, it returns to the 
initial state and attempts to establish a new safety connec-
tion again. In the llth steps, H reaches to the state 
(WAIT_SS, WFTC_S, CONR_S_T, WFAU3_F, IDLE_SF). 
In this state, P3 attempts to indicate the transport connection 
by sending T-CONN.ind, but P4 does not accept it in state 
WFAU3_F. According to Definition 3, it is a reachable il-
legal state. There is no any other executable activity, and 
these processes are blocked. There are two methods that can 
make the system continué the execution. One is to add a 
safety disconnection function to the state WAIT_SS of Pu 
the other is to add the function of restab responding to P2 (the 
two dashed ares). 
Based on these results, a conclusión can be drawn that 
restab also has the function of avoiding deadlocks in the 
safety communication protocol. So it is a mistake to drop 
the response events of Testab in the abstraction model. An-
other mistake in H is a lack of the safety disconnection 
function in the state WAIT_SS of Ph After the are from the 
state WAIT_SS to the state IDLE_SS is added to Px and the 
two dashed ares are added to P2, the mistakes in H are cor-
rected and a new PROMELA model is ready for the pro-
moted H. The properties of the promoted H model checking 
results are given below. 
Properties 1 and 2 are satisfied. The end-state and the 
progress labels are added to the right end states and eyeling 
states. The satisfaction to the properties 1 and 2 is crucial 
for correetly exprés sing the LTL formulae which are used to 
verify the following properties. 
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Figure 7 A trace leading to the deadlock. 
Property 3 is not satisfied. Through a given counterex-
ample, we find that the safety connection set-up process 
fails after the SaS user of the sponsor receives the connec-
tion request service primitive with an error format. 
Property 4 is not satisfied. Both the SaS user of the 
sponsor and follower are guaranteed to eventually receive 
the disconnection indication from an underlayer at least 
once during a PROMELA run. 
Properties 5 and 6 are satisfied. 
According to these model checking results, two crucial 
features of the SFM layer are revealed. Firstly, it may never 
receive the connection confirmation after the SaS user of 
the sponsor sends the safety connection request. It is guar-
antees that the safety protocol does not satisfy the forward 
mandatory consistency of Property 3. This is because there 
may be deletion or modification of the messages sent from a 
RBC to a train. The failure of the safety connection set-up 
process must be reported to the SaS user using disconnec-
tion indication primitive. Secondly, the safety layer cannot 
guarantee that the safe connection is kept all the time. It is 
because that the safety protocol is built upon the non-trusted 
"open" channel. For example, the communication connec-
tion between a train and a RBC may be disconnected be-
cause of the breakdown of GSM-R. In the situation of ab-
normal communication disconnection persisting beyond a 
reasonable time, the SaS user needs to make safety defenees 
such as an emergeney brake. 
5 Application and performance 
The formal verification method presented above is used 
during the development process of a safety communication 
protocol in the communication based train control (CBTC) 
systems [7]. During the debug process of a first versión 
(versión 1) implement of the safety communication protocol 
in the CBTC system, some hidden problems are very hard 
to be found from the massive amounts of code. For example, 
the safety connection cannot be established if it is discon-
nected after a long time. Some of the reasons are that the 
designed specification does not satisfy some safety applica-
tion requirements [37]. To solve this problem and reduce 
the code debugging time, the formal verification method 
presented above is used during the development of the sec-
ond versión (versión 2) of the safety communication proto-
col in the CBTC system. The specification of the safety 
communication protocol is described using IA and verified 
by the model checker SPIN. According to the formal de-
scription of IA, the safety protocol is refined and imple -
mented using the C language over Vxworks real-time oper-
ating system above the UDP layer. The experiment results 
show that the design eyele is shortened, and the develop-
ment and debugging efficieney are enhanced. The real-time 
performance of the advanced protocol is obtained using 
network simulation tool OPNET [7, 38]. The simulation 
results show that the real-time performance satisfies the 
safety requirements. 
To analyze the performance of two protocols in terms of 
safety, the test is performed under the same conditions. The 
direct impact of the potential safety hazards is data losses of 
channel, which result in a disconnection of safety connec-
tion. Therefore, in this paper, we present safety connection 
disconnection rate with different data losses according to 
the test conditions presented in Table 1. 
Table 1 Test coiiditioiis of the safety commuiiicatioii protocols 
Test conditioiis 
Commuiiicatioii cycle 
Times of safety coimectioii 
Application message length 
Traiisport layer protocol 
Standard of Ethernet 
Transmutation rate of Ethernet 
Valúes 
0.2 (s) 
5000 
100 (byte) 
UDP 
IEEE 802.3 
100 (Mbit s"1) 
— Versión 1 
—- Versión 2 
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Figure 8 Comparison of probability of safety connection disconnection. 
Figure 8 shows the characteristics of abnormal discon-
nections in these two protocols when the channel quality of 
transport layer is from 85% to 100%. As observed from the 
figure, the protocol of versión 2 always gives a better safety 
connection, which further proves the effectivenes s of our 
method. 
6 Conclusión 
In this study, a formal description method is developed for 
the TCS safety communication protocols using IA. The 
safety service interface behaviors and scenario-based inter-
actions of the safety protocols are described using IA and 
UML sequence diagram. How IA can be translated into 
PROMELA language for the verification of the safety pro-
tocols has also been presented. In our method, SPIN is used 
for the verification of deadlocks, livelocks and some man-
datory consisteney properties. However, the method is not 
limited to these properties. Since IA are translated into 
PROMELA, the full range of the SPIN verification system 
is variable. Once validated and checked, this specification 
can be used as a base for a design and implementation. 
The feasibility of the method is demonstrated by apply-
ing it to an example. The preliminary results show both 
potential efficieney and practical utility of the method. The 
causes of the deadlocks in the specification of the safety 
protocols in TCS are found out using the counterexample of 
SPIN. This formal verification method has been used to 
develop the CBTC safety communication protocol. This 
protocol has already been applied to Beijing subway Yi-
zhuang line and Changping line. It is also expected that the 
development of a new safety communication protocol will 
be significantly accelerated with the help of the proposed 
method, and the safety level will be remarkably enhanced as 
well. As future work, we plan to develop an automatic 
translator from IA to PROMELA model based on the pro-
posed translation rules. 
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